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For anyone who has ever taken an undergraduate course on conceptual seman-
tics, the following story should sound familiar. Once upon a time, people held to
a Lockean, ‘classical’ view of concepts, according to which the meaning of words
like bachelor or bird can be broken down into a list of necessary and sufficient
criteria (‘an unmarried man’, or ‘a feathered, winged creature that lays eggs’)
and concept membership was a simple, black-and-white matter of meeting all
these criteria. Then, in the 1970s, Eleanor Rosch and her colleagues proved this
view wrong with a series of psychological experiments, so that nowadays we all
believe that concepts are prototypes - abstract embodiments of the quintessen-
tial bachelor or the most ‘bird-like’ bird - and concept membership is graded,
determined by the degree of resemblance to such prototypes.
But of course, things quickly turn out to be more complicated than this.
Membership of concepts like ODD NUMBER is still decided on the basis of def-
initional criteria - the number 12 is clearly non-odd, despite its high similarity
to odd numbers like 11 and 21. Neither is is possible to maintain a clear bound-
ary between concepts with prototype structures and concepts with definitional
structures: membership of a concept like GRANDMOTHER, for example, is
clearly a black-and-white matter, but at the same time we do possess a notion
of the ‘quintessential grandmother’ - say, a grey-haired, twinkly-eyed lady who
spends her days knitting, petting cats and handing out homemade biscuits. In
addition, people like Armstrong, Gleitman, and Gleitman (1983) have argued
that graded typicality judgements do not necessarily reflect the underlying con-
ceptual structure at all: in a series of studies, they show that even concepts like
EVEN NUMBER yield graded typicality judgements, despite the fact that all
their participants agreed that no even number could be ‘more’ or ‘less’ even than
any other even number. Finally, Osherson and Smith (1981) note that reduc-
ing concepts to typicality structures predicts the wrong meanings for complex
concepts: assuming that the meaning of PET FISH has to be compositionally
derived from the meanings of PET and FISH, the classical approach simply de-
fines a pet fish as an entity that meets both the criteria for PET and the criteria
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for FISH, while the prototype approach wrongly predicts that membership of
the concept PET FISH should be determined by the degree of resemblance to
something like a furry, cuddly herring (see also Fodor & Lepore, 1996; Hampton
& Jonsson, 2012; Kamp & Partee, 1995; Storms, Boeck, Hampton, & Mechelen,
1999, and many others). In short, it seems a full theory of conceptual cognition
needs elements of both Prototype Theory and the classical theory, as well as an
account of the way membership judgements are influenced by factors unrelated
to prototypicality (e.g. Armstrong et al., 1983; Barsalou, 1987; Kamp & Partee,
1995; Malt & Smith, 1982; Prinz, 2012).
One of the most influential papers offering a concrete hybrid model of the clas-
sical and prototype theories of conceptual cognition is Kamp and Partee (1995).
Kamp & Partee assume that not all concepts are associated with prototypes;
also, those that do are not reduced to their prototypes, but may combine a
typicality structure with ‘classical’, definitional membership criteria.
In this paper, I explore the Kamp & Partee typology of concepts from a
linguistic perspective. By empirically investigating the conceptual semantics of
‘gradable nouns’ like idiot, nerd, genius or sports fan, I will provide support
for several of Kamp & Partee’s claims: (1) Not all concepts that have graded
membership have a prototype, and vice versa; (2) prototypicality is defined
in terms of what I will call ‘maximal embodiment’ of a concept, and if such
maximal embodiment is not possible (because some of the properties that are
central to the concept can have potentially infinite values) the concept will
lack a prototype. Furthermore, I will claim that the class of nouns that are
linguistically gradable (which I will define as ‘denoting a predicate with a degree
argument’, as evidenced by their ability to appear in constructions like (1))
correspond precisely to those concepts that have graded membership but lack a
prototype.
(1) a. Sally is a huge sports fan.
b. James is an incredible nerd.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 1, I will introduce a (slightly
modified version of) Kamp & Partee’s typology of concepts. I will present some
linguistic evidence that this typology has a direct correspondent in the semantics
of the corresponding natural language expressions, in particular the well-known
distinction between absolute and relative gradable adjectives. I hypothesise
that relative adjectives like tall and old correspond to gradable concepts without
prototypes, while absolute adjectives like open and clean correspond to gradable
concepts with prototypes. Furthermore, I claim that nouns like those in (1) fall
into the former conceptual class.
In section 2 I move on to the meat of this paper: an experimental investi-
gation of the conceptual semantics of gradable nouns, intended to test the hy-
pothesis that their corresponding concepts lack prototypes. I present evidence
that what appear to be prototypicality effects with these nouns (such as Albert
Einstein representing the quintessential GENIUS) are correlated with both fa-
miliarity and emotional attitude, and propose that they are better analysed in
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terms of ‘accessibility’, where certain instances are seen as representative of a
concept not because they embody the associated properties to a higher degree,
but because they are more salient for some reason. (In other words, while we
can straightforwardly predict membership ratings for instances of BIRD based
on these instances’ resemblance to e.g. a robin or blackbird, we cannot predict
membership ratings for geniuses based on their degree of similarity to Einstein.)
I also present evidence that the properties that are most strongly associated with
concepts like NERD and GENIUS are inherently ‘limitless’ properties, in the
sense that it is always possible to come up with an instance of the concept that
embodies these properties to an even higher degree; following Kamp & Partee’s
reasoning, this points towards the absence of a prototype.
Finally, section 3 will reflect on the implications of our experimental findings
for the various questions I started out this paper with, and on the Kamp/Partee
typology itself; I will also discuss some remaining issues and point out some
directions for future research.
1 Kamp and Partee’s typology of concepts
In a well-known paper, Kamp and Partee (1995) provide a tentative typology of
concepts that is based on three semi-independent criteria: (i) whether a concept
is vague or sharp ([V]), (ii) whether it does or does not have a prototype
([P]), and (iii) whether its extension is or is not determined by prototypicality
(PE]). The following table, adapted from Kamp & Partee, shows examples
for each category: ‘Vagueness’ is the property of having an inherently imprecise
meaning van Rooij (2011); thus,tall is vague because it is impossible to define
an exact boundary between things that are tall and things that are not. In
contrast, ‘sharp’ defines properties, like odd or even, whose meaning can be
precisely defined: a number is either odd or even, and no number can be more
odd or even than another one.
The distinction between [P] and [PE] concepts is Kamp & Partee’s an-
swer to some of the questions raised in the introduction to this paper. They
combine aspects of both the classical theory of concepts and prototype the-
ory by assuming that concepts have prototypes but are not reduced to them:
so, concepts can have both a prototype structure and ‘classical’, definitional
membership criteria. [-P] concepts do not have prototypes at all (more on the
reasoning behind this later). For those concepts that have a prototype ([+P]),
resemblance to this prototype usually determines concept membership, but not
necessarily so. For natural kinds like BIRD and other concepts like ADOLES-
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CENT, concept membership is essentially definitional: one is an adolescent if
and only if one is neither young enough to be a child not old enough to be an
adult, and one is a bird if and only if one has bird DNA. Nevertheless, instances
of ADOLESCENT and BIRD can easily be rated according to their resemblance
to an abstract prototype, whose properties might have little in common with
the definitional criteria that define membership (for example, self-centeredness
and an overpowering smell of Axe body spray as typical properties for ADO-
LESCENT).
Kamp & Partee also assume that the prototype of a concept C is defined
as the abstract entity which is most C-like, i.e. most embodies the dimensions
of C; I will call this the maximal embodiment interpretation of prototypicality,
and examine it in a bit more detail in section 2.2. Kamp & Partee argue that
it follows from this that TALL cannot have a prototype: tallness has no upper
bound, so there is no entity (not even an abstract one) which is most tall.1
The other reason that concepts like TALL do not have a prototype in Kamp &
Partee’s typology is that “it can be applied to an indefinite variety of things”
- what counts as tall in a human is not the same as what counts as tall in a
skyscraper.
1.1 Vagueness and gradability
In the following sections, I will examine the relation between the different con-
cept classes proposed by Kamp & Partee on the one hand, and several linguistic
properties of the corresponding natural language expressions on the other. In
the present section, I will look at linguistic gradability; in the next section, at
the difference between nominal and adjectival concepts.
An (adjectival) predicate like tall is gradable if it can hold of an object to a
greater or lesser degree; linguistically, this is reflected by their ability to appear
in degree constructions like the following:
(2) John is
$&
%
6 feet tall.
very tall.
taller than Bill.
,.
-
In order to account for the semantics of this predicate, an influential approach
(e.g. Cresswell, 1976; Heim, 2000; Kennedy, 1997; von Stechow, 1984, and many
others) assumes that they denote relations between entities and degrees (‘degree
predicates’), as follows:
(3) talld,et = λdλxrtallpdqpxqs
1Peter Ga¨rdenfors (e.g. Gardenfors, 2004) argues that prototypicality is represented as
centrality in a conceptual space. Given that a conceptual space represents similarity, the
center of such a space has the property of bearing simultaneously the most similarity to all
other points in the space, and the least similarity to all points outside it (cf. Rosch & Mervis,
1975, for experimental results that suggest the same). But in the case of a limitless property
(like tallness), there is no such point - for any given instantiation of TALL, for example, there
is always another one that bears even less resemblance to the contrasting concept of SHORT
(put plainly: something or someone may always be taller). So the conclusion that TALL
cannot have a prototype follows also in Ga¨rdenfors’s approach.
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Degree constructions like the one in (2) involve a comparison between the degree
to which a given entity possesses a certain property and some other degree d1; the
value of d1 is provided by expressions like six feet or than Bill, or by a so-called
standard degree. For example, the sentence John is tall is usually analysed in
terms of a covert comparison between John’s height and a standard degree stall,
which is contextually determined and roughly represents the average height of
John’s peer group.
(4) rrJohn is tallss = Ddrtallpdqpjq ^ d ¡ stalls
Another class of gradable predicates involves standard degrees that are fixed
rather than contextually determined Cruse (1980); Kennedy and McNally (2005).
This is the class of absolute predicates (in contrast to predicates like tall, which
are called relative): predicates like open, empty, safe and transparent. Relative
and absolute adjectives show distinct linguistic behaviour, for example in the
type of modification they are compatible with: relative adjectives do not allow
endpoint modifiers like completely, while intensifiers like very or incredibly are
marginal with many absolute adjectives (Bolinger, 1972):
(5) a. Sally is incredibly/*barely/*completely/*maximally tall.
b. The window is *incredibly/barely/completely/maximally open.
A common approach to the relative/absolute distinction assumes that the former
lack both a minimal and a maximal value2, while the latter have either or both.
If an adjective has minimal or maximal values, its associates standard degree
coincides with one or the other (Kennedy and McNally 2005; see also Cruse
1980; Kennedy 2007; Rotstein and Winter 2004). For example, the statement
the glass is empty is true if and only if the glass is maximally empty; in contrast,
the statement the door is open is true if and only if the door has a non-zero
degree of openness (Yoon, 1996). If an adjective has neither a maximal nor a
minimal value, its standard degree has to be determined by context.
All in all, we can distinguish four classes of adjectives in this way:
(6) a. Relative adjectives: neither a minimal nor a maximal value
(tall, intelligent, old)
b. Absolute adjectives with both a minimal and a maximal value (open,
closed, empty, transparent)
2The idea that relative adjectives have no minimal value may seem strange if we consider
adjectives like tall, old, cheap or fast ; after all, we have clear mathematical notions of zero
height, zero age or zero speed. However, zero does not appear to be part of the linguistic set of
degrees corresponding to these adjectives: for example, I find statements like # My house is
extremely slow or # I am going faster than that house to be quite anomalous. Put differently,
having a speed, height, or age of absolutely zero is the same as having no speed, height or
age at all (Lehrer, 1985). But for any speed, height or age greater than zero - even for a tiny
value - we will always be able to imagine someone or something who is, for example, only
half that age or height or moves even slower. In other words, the linguistic scale of ‘tallness’
asymptotically approaches zero (so to speak) and, hence, is usually considered unbounded on
both sides.
5
c. Absolute adjectives with a minimal but no maximal value (dirty,
dangerous, sick)
d. Absolute adjectives with a maximal but no minimal value (clean,
safe, healthy)
(Note that, for each member of the classes (a) and (b), its antonym is a member
of the same class, whereas the antonyms of the adjectives in (c) are members of
class (d) and vice versa.)
The Kennedy/McNally approach to the relative/absolute distinction allows
us to established our first link between the semantics of gradable expressions
and the Kamp/Partee typology. Recall the two reasons for Kamp & Partee to
propose that concepts like TALL do not have a prototype: there is no limit to
tallness, and its interpretation is context-dependent. In the above approach,
these two properties are tied together: all and only all completely unbounded
properties have a standard that is determined by context.
The properties of relative adjectives like tall, wide and intelligent clearly place
them in the [+V-P] class. How do the concepts denoted by absolute adjectives
like open and empty fit into Kamp & Partee’s typology?
First, for those adjectives (likeopen, empty and clean) that have maximal
values, it makes sense to assume that their corresponding concepts have proto-
types. Neither of the reasons Kamp & Partee give for TALL’s lack of a prototype
apply to a concept like OPEN: it can be maximally embodied (once an aperture
of some sort reaches a certain level of openness, it simply cannot get any more
open), and its meaning does not vary with context the way tall does: regardless
whether we are talking of doors, mouths, or boxes, open retains the same core
meaning. A seven-foot human counts as tall, a seven-foot giraffe does not; but
doors, mouths and boxes that feature an inch-wide aperture all count as open.
On the other hand, at least part of Kamp & Partee’s reasoning about TALL
does extend to the concepts (like dirty) denoted by adjectives that have mini-
mal but no maximal value: like height, dirtiness is an unbounded property, and
cannot be maximally embodied. I will therefore assume that, like relative ad-
jectives, absolute adjectives that lack a maximal degree correspond to concept
without prototypes.
Whether absolute predicates are sharp or vague is controversial (e.g. Burnett,
2014; Kennedy, 2007; Lassiter & Goodman, 2013; Lewis, 1979; Sassoon, 2012;
van Rooij, 2011). On the one hand, as suggested above, the boundary between
things that are P and things that are not P seems quite clearly defined with
absolute adjectives: even a slightly open door counts as open, not as closed. On
the other hand, there are many examples in the literature of presumably vague
uses of absolute adjectives: for example, while the sentence “The restaurant is
full tonight” could mean that the restaurant is serving the maximal number of
guests, it also has a salient interpretation that can be paraphrased as something
like “The restaurant is fuller than expected”, where the standard is supplied by
context (e.g. the usual number of guests for this restaurants on this particular
night of the week) (Rotstein & Winter, 2004). So, depending on which side of
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the debate we pick, we may classify absolute adjectives with maximal values as
either [-V+P-PE], on a par with concepts like GRANDMOTHER and BIRD,
or as [+V+P+PE], on a par with concepts like RED and FURNITURE.
Is OPEN more like GRANDMOTHER or more like RED? An important
parallel between OPEN and RED is that there is a close link between their
prototypes and their membership criteria: the prototype of RED captures what
it means to be red, and the prototype of OPEN captures what it means to be
open. In contrast, as we have seen, the prototypes of GRANDMOTHER and
BIRD are independent of what being a grandmother or a bird means: being
a grandmother just means being a woman who has grandchildren, not having
grey hair and twinkly eyes and being fond of knitting.
I propose the following way out in order to avoid making a commitment
on the vagueness of absolute adjectives, which is not really my concern here.
Instead of distinguishing concepts on the basis of vagueness ([V]), I will dis-
tinguish them on the basis of (conceptual) gradability: a concept is gradable
([+G]) if it expresses a property that can hold of an object to a greater or lesser
degree. This includes all [+V] concepts like TALL, ADOLESCENT, RED and
FURNITURE, and also includes OPEN and EMPTY, but it excludes [-V] con-
cepts like ODD NUMBER and GRANDMOTHER.
To sum up: the fact that all the examples Kamp & Partee give of [+V-P]
concepts are relative adjectives is not a coincidence. If we define a prototype
of a concept C in terms of maximal embodiment of C, it follows that only
naturally bounded concepts can have a prototype: for unbounded concepts, no
instantiation could ever be most C. On the linguistic side, we see this conceptual
(un)boundedness reflected in the structure of the degree scale associated with
the adjective corresponding to the concept.
1.2 Gradable nouns
In the literature on gradability and degree, the usual examples are adjectives
(and adverbs) - however, it has often been observed that other lexical cate-
gories may be gradable as well (e.g. Abney, 1987; Bolinger, 1972; de Vries, 2010;
Doetjes, 1997; Kennedy & McNally, 2005; Morzycki, 2009; Sassoon, 2007). For
example, there exists a class of nouns that behaves exactly like the relative ad-
jectives (modulo independent syntactic differences) - for example, they can be
modified by precisely those adjectives that, in adverbial form, modify degree in
adjectival predicates:
(7) a. Bill is enormously stupid.
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b. Bill is an enormous idiot.
(8) a. Sally is incredibly nerdy.
b. Sally is an incredible nerd.
Moreover, it can be shown that these nouns denote degree predicates by ex-
ploiting the observation that such predicates are monotone in the following
sense (Heim, 2000):
(9) Monotonicity of degree predicates
A function f of type xd, ety is monotone iff
@x@d@d1rfpdqpxq = 1 ^ d1   dÑ fpd1qpxq = 1s
This monotonicity is detectable in several ways; for example, it is responsible
for the following contrast (Katz, 2005; Nouwen, 2009):
(10) a. John is surprisingly/unexpectedly/incredibly tall. (degree reading)
b. John is unsurprisingly/expectedly/credibly tall. (no degree reading)
The reasoning here is as follows. As demonstrated by the entailment pattern in
(11), evaluative modifiers like surprising are downward monotone: they reverse
the entailment relations in their scope.
(11) a. Mary read a romance novel ñ Mary read a book.
b. It’s surprising for Mary to read a romance novel ð It’s surprising for
Mary to read a book.
So, when a modifier like surprisingly is applied to a degree predicate, the
direction of monotonicity of the degree predicate is reversed: [[surprisingly
tall ]] is a predicate for which it holds that @x@d@d1rsurprisingptallpd1qpxqq =
1 Ñ surprisingptallpdqpxqq ^ d1   d = 1s. In words: if it is suprising for John
to be tall to a degree d, him being tall to any higher degree d1 ¡ d would also
be surprising. With a non-downward monotone modifier like unsurprisingly,
there is no such entailment reversal: if it is unsurprising for John to be tall to a
degree d, him being tall to any lower degree d1   d would also be unsurprising.
But in fact, by the definition in (9), John is tall to all lower degrees d1. This
makes being unsurprisingly tall is a trivial property: everyone with a height,
no matter how small, is unsurprisingly tall. Nouwen (2009) assumes that such
trivially true interpretations are ruled out for pragmatic reasons; hence, the only
available interpretation for a sentence like (10a) can be paraphrased as “It is
unsurprising/expected/credible that John is tall”
Morzycki-nouns show the same pattern when modified by an evaluative ad-
jective, which can be accounted for straightforwardly when we assume that these
nouns, too, denote monotone degree predicates:
(12) a. Bill is an unbelievable/extraordinary/indescribable idiot. (degree
reading)
b. Bill is a believable/ordinary/describable idiot. (no degree reading)
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In a way very similar to Nouwen’s approach above, de Vries (2010); Morzycki
(2009) account for the contrast between (8) and the following parallel sentences,
which cannot be used to express the proposition that Bill’s degree of idiocy is
very low:
(13) a. #Bill is diminutively stupid.3 (no degree reading)
b. Bill is a diminutive idiot. (no degree reading)
Given this strong evidence for the claim that nouns like idiot and nerd
(other examples are fan, psychopath, airhead, goat cheese aficionado, simpleton,
loser and weirdo) are linguistically gradable in exactly the sense that adjectives
like tall are, we may wonder which aspect of their semantics makes them so.
Morzycki speculates that these nouns are gradable because they ‘identify a single
scale’: what makes a weirdo a weirdo is just their degree of weirdness, which
means that different instances of WEIRDO can easily be ordered on such a
scale.
While Morzycki’s description is definitely a step in the right direction, I feel
it is not entirely accurate. There are nouns like nerd that are clearly grad-
able (as (13b) shows), yet nerdiness is a cocktail of many different properties,
and doesn’t seem measurable on a single dimension. Conversely, why wouldn’t
chair be gradable, on a single, one-dimensional scale of how much it resembles
a typical chair? Just as with absolute adjectives, the bounded end of the de-
gree scale would correspond to maximal embodiment of the prototype. People
would easily be able to order a collection of more or less chair-like objects along
such a scale. Yet chair does not admit degree readings of size adjectives - an
enormous chair is a physically big chair, not a very typical chair. Finally, it
is unclear why the distinction between one- versus many-dimensional concepts
should play a role in the availability of linguistic gradability in the first place,
as many multidimensional adjectives are linguistically gradable (e.g. intelligent
or healthy).4
On the other hand, however, the fact that chair does not admit degree read-
ings of size and evaluative adjectives may be exactly what we should expect
given that CHAIR is a [+P] concept that can be maximally embodied. The
same holds for maximal-value absolute adjectives (e.g. “*The door is enor-
mously/unbelievably open”). Perhaps nouns like chair correspond to absolute
adjectives, being gradable in a similar sense. This is the view espoused by
Sassoon (2007): in Sassoon’s view, nouns like chair are gradable because their
referents can be more or less typical examples of the concept the noun denotes.
This is supported by the grammaticality of sentences like the following:
(14) a. This object is more a chair than a stool.
3I am hashing this sentence because I am not quite sure it is interpretable at all.
4(Multi)dimensionality does seem to play a role in nominal gradability in a different way:
in a series of papers, Galit Weidman Sassoon argues that multidimensional predicates fall into
different classes depending on the way the values of its dimensions are integrated, and that
this classification correlates with a predicate’s ability to appear in various degree constructions
(e.g. Sassoon, 2016; Sassoon & Fadlon, 2015).
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b. This object is almost/barely a chair.
In fact, the classes of nouns with which Morzycki and Sassoon concern them-
selves more or less seem to be in complementary distribution in the same way
that relative and absolute adjectives are:
(15) a. Bill is a huge/incredible idiot. (degree reading)
b. This object is a huge/incredible chair. (no degree reading)
(16) a. *?Bill is nearly/barely an idiot.
b. A stool is nearly/barely a chair.5
Thus, a possible synthesis of Morzycki’s and Sassoon’s approaches to nominal
gradability, and a connection to our adjectival data, suggests itself: like abso-
lute adjectives, ‘Sassoon nouns’ are compatible with endpoint modifiers but do
not allow size and evaluative degree modification, and like relative adjectives,
‘Morzycki nouns’ are incompatible with endpoint modifiers but do allow degree
readings of size and evaluative modifiers. This suggests that the former class
corresponds to [+G+P] concepts (note that this is exactly how Kamp & Partee
classify CHAIR), and the latter to [+G-P] ones.
In the remainder of this paper, I will not concern myself much with the
conceptual properties of the Sassoon nouns, because Sassoon herself has written
on this extensively. Instead, I will focus on empirically defending the claim that
Morzycki-nouns denote [+G-P] concepts.
2 Gradable nouns as [-P] concepts
I propose that the class of Morzycki-nouns can be defined in prototype-theoretic
terms as exactly those nouns that denote [+G-P] concepts: categories whose
membership is gradable, but which lack a prototype. For nouns that are directly
derived from [+G-P]-denoting adjectives, this does not actually seem a bold
proposal. Dutch, for example, has a relatively productive operation of adding
the suffix -erd to property-denoting adjectives in order to form a noun meaning
‘a person with this property’: thus, slim ‘clever’ becomes slimmerd, dik ‘fat’
becomes dikkerd, gemeen ‘mean’ becomes gemenerd, and so on. These nouns,
like the adjectives, are all linguistically gradable, so there is no reason to assume
that they do not inherit their conceptual structure from the adjective. They
exemplify Morzycki’s aforementioned definition of a ‘gradable noun’: a noun
with a single measurable dimension. But as I already noted, the class of gradable
nouns also includes nouns that seem more complex nouns like nerd, genius, and
5I am inclined to think that this particular example, as well as (14a), are cases of met-
alinguistic gradability (cf. McCawley 1988’s ‘metalinguistic comparison’: “Your problems
are more financial than legal”), but in later papers, Sassoon has presented more quantifica-
tional evidence that at least ‘social’ nouns (human roles, such as journalist and artifacts such
as chair) are relatively OK in various real degree constructions (Sassoon & Fadlon, 2016).
See also section 3 for more on the possible connections between Sassoon’s findings and the
approach presented in this paper.
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perhaps idiot, whose interpretation depends on multiple dimensions. Take nerd,
which is probably the best example. Whether someone can be called a nerd
depends on many things: their IQ, computer skills, certain aspects of their
look, their knowledge of obscure science fiction movies, and so on. Some of
these dimensions may themselves have prototypes. How can we know whether
NERD, as a whole, has one?
First, note that for every putative NERD-prototype we come up with, we
can, in principle, imagine someone who is even more nerdy: someone whose
IQ is ever so slightly higher, whose eyesight is just the tiniest bit worse, whose
programming skills extend to just one more programming language. This seems
to indicate that the concept denoted by nerd cannot be maximally embodied,
and hence has no prototype.
Now, consider the concept GENIUS. There are many dimensions one can
associate with genius - high IQ, natural talent for a particular art or science,
excellence at a very young age, representing a turning point in the history of
their field, lasting relevance - and no matter which genius we pick, we can come
up with someone who embodies these dimensions more. However, there are
certain people we associate with the quintessential genius: 9 out of 10 people
will probably mention Albert Einstein when asked to list examples of geniuses,
and the name is likely to be on top of most of those lists as well. We can
answer the question “Was Albert Einstein a genius?” affirmatively without
the least bit of hesitation. All these are measures that are highly correlated
with prototypicality (Laurence and Margolis (1999)). So does this mean that
GENIUS has a prototype?
I propose the ready availability of Albert Einstein as the quintessential ge-
nius is related to the difference between prototypicality - the degree to which
a particular instance resembles an abstract prototype - and accessibility: the
ease with which a particular instance is retrieved from memory (cf. Ashcraft,
1978). This difference has been demonstrated perhaps most strikingly in the
previously mentioned series of studies by Armstrong et al. (1983). When asked
to rate different even numbers for exemplariness of well-defined categories like
EVEN NUMBER, subjects gave graded responses (favouring 2 and 4 over 34
and 806, for example), even though they all agreed that no even number could
be ‘more’ or ‘less’ even than any other even number. Armstrong et al. speculate
that such choices reflect the identification heuristics we employ when categoris-
ing various kinds of objects: for example, when deciding whether a natural
number is even, most people will check whether it is divisible by 2, a check that
is probably quicker to perform for some numbers than for others. So, graded
responses do not necessarily tell us anything about the underlying conceptual
structure of a category: they may merely tell us that some instances are faster
and easier to categorise than others, with resemblance to a prototype only one
of many possible heuristics. This is what I will refer to as the accessibility of
an instance6. I speculate that anything that makes a given instance salient fa-
6Armstrong et al. use the term ‘exemplariness’, but since this might be misconstrued as
referring to Exemplar Theory - a competitor to Prototype Theory - I will use a more neutral
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cilitates its accessibility; in the case of human nouns like GENIUS this might
be factors like: familiarity with someone’s life and/or work, the frequency with
which this person is mentioned in the media, or a strong emotional opinion on
someone. Thus, Albert Einstein counts as the ‘quintessential’ genius not be-
cause he embodies the concept more than anyone else (although he obviously
embodies it to a large degree), but because he is extremely well-known to the ex-
tent that his name has become synonymous with ‘an intelligent person’. There
is no sense in which genius is measured in terms of ‘resemblance to Einstein’
similar to, for example, the way ‘bird-ness’ is measured in terms of resemblance
to a prototypical bird.
In short, I expect that ‘typicality’ ratings for GENIUS will correlate strongly
with (semi-)independent factors like familiarity and emotional attitude. On the
other hand, familiarity has been shown not to affect typicality judgements in
concepts with clear prototypes such as BIRD Malt and Smith (1982); I expect
the same will hold for emotional attitude.
In the remainder of this section, I describe 3 different experiments. Experiment
1 uses a classic typicality rating task (Rosch, 1973) in order to elicitate typicality
ratings for various instances of BIRD and GENIUS. The same participants also
rated the same instances on two dimensions that should be independent from
typicality: familiarity and emotional attitude. The experiment was designed to
substantiate the above claim that graded membership ratings for the concept
GENIUS do not primarily reflect degrees of resemblance to an Einstein-like
prototype, but are heavily influenced by an instance’s accessibility.
2.1 Experiment 1
2.1.1 Method
Participants
An online questionnaire (made with Google Forms) was sent out to a total of
19 participants, recruited from my personal Facebook friends, who participated
for a chance to win one of three five-euro gift certificates. All participants were
speakers of Dutch and almost all were college or university graduates.
Procedure
The questionnaire consisted of four subparts (the fourth was part of experiment
2 and will be discussed in the next section). Part 2 was a classic category
membership rating task, with instructions inspired by Rosch’s seminal typicality
rating experiment (Rosch, 1973). In this task, participants were asked to rate
how well they felt a certain individual represented a given category on a scale
from 1 to 7, with 1 representing a perfect example and 7 a really bad one. Part
1 and 3 used the same seven-point scale rating system, but in part 1 subjects
were asked to indicate their familiarity with several instantiations of a given
term.
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Task 1: familiarity ratings
Your task is to rate each bird and each genius on a scale from 1 to 7, indicating your
familiarity with the genius or bird species in question. Give an 1 to birds or geniuses
that you know very well; give a 7 to birds or geniuses that are completely new to you;
and give suitable intermediate ratings to the ones in between.
(At the top of the page containing the GENIUS instances) Study the pic-
tured/described geniuses. Do you recognise both the name and the face of the genius,
are you aware of their field and the way they contributed to it, do you know the im-
portant biographical details? Then give the genius a 1. Have you never heard of this
person before? Give them a 7. If the genius looks/sounds familiar to you but you don’t
know a lot of details, give them a 4, and so on. Follow your intuition: there’s no need
to keep mental lists of all the facts you know and your knowledge will not be tested in
any way.
(At the top of the page containing the BIRD instances) Study the pictured/described
birds. Do you recognise both the name and appearance of the bird, have you often seen
it on pictures or in real life, do you know its characteristics and habits (like habitat
and food)? Then give the bird a 1. Have you never seen the bird (pictured) before and
does its name mean nothing to you, give it a 7. If the bird looks/sounds familiar to
you but you don’t know a lot of details, give it a 4, and so on. Follow your intuition:
there’s no need to keep mental lists of all the facts you know and your knowledge will
not be tested in any way.
Task 2: typicality
Your task, again, is to rate each pictured individual on a scale from 1 to 7, but in
contrast to the previous part it’s not about your knowledge of the bird or genius in
question, but about the extent to which you feel the pictured individual is a good and
representative example of the category in question. If the pictured individual is it a
perfectly representative example of what you think it means to be a bird or a genius,
give him/her/it an 1. If the pictured individual is a very bad example of the concept
- an animal that hardly resembles a bird, a person who you feel isn’t much of a genius
at all - give him/her/it a 7. A moderately representative bird or genius gets a 4, and
so on. Don’t think about it too much, just follow your intuition.
(Repeated - just mentioning ‘genius’ or ‘bird’, respectively - at the top of both
the page containing the GENIUS instances, and the page containing the BIRD in-
stances)
Task 3: emotional attitude
Study the pictured birds and geniuses and indicate to what extent your feelings about
them are positive or negative. Does a particular bird or a particular genius make you
super happy, give him/her/it a 1. If you feel it’s a very unpleasant individual, give
him/her/it a 7. Is your emotion neutral, give him/her/it a 4, and so on. It doesn’t
matter whether you can justify or explain your feelings; just follow your intuition.
(Repeated - just mentioning ‘genius’ or ‘bird’, respectively - at the top of both
the page containing the GENIUS instances, and the page containing the BIRD in-
stances)
Table 1: Instructions for Experiment 1.
concept, while in part 3 they indicated their emotional attitude towards these
instantiations.
The questionnaire as a whole was prefaced by a general introduction, explain-
ing that I was interested in questions of categorisation such as “Is an avocado a
fruit?” and “Is a skateboard a vehicle?”, and the various bases on which people
make such decisions. Each individual subtask was prefaced by instructions spe-
cific to the task; these instructions were repeated at the top of each page of that
subtask, so participants were able to review the instructions at each page of the
questionnaire. The instructions (translated from Dutch and slightly shortened)
can be found in table 2.1.1.
Stimuli
In each of the 3 parts of the questionnaire, the same two concept names were
presented (BIRD and GENIUS), each with 10 instantiations. Instantiations
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ROCK BUNTING: this songbird measures 16 cm and occurs in Asia, Northern Africa
and Southern Europe. It builds its nest on or near the ground and feeds on insects
and birds.
RABINDRANATH TAGORE (1861-1942): Bengali poet, composer, writer, painter,
independence and peace activist and educational reformer. Published his first volume
of poetry when he was 16 and his first opera when he was 20. Became the first non-
Western winner of the Nobel Prize for literature in 1913 and founded his own university
with the prize money. Composed the national anthems of both India and Bangladesh.
Table 2: Example of the kind of descriptions used in Task 1, 2 and 3 of Exper-
iment 1.
were presented in the form of a picture accompanied by the name and a short
description; examples of these descriptions can be found in table 2. The 10
instances of GENIUS, chosen to represent a wide range of fields, achievements,
time periods and nationalities, as well as both genders, were: Leonardo da Vinci,
Emily Dickinson, Dmitri Mendeleev, Steve Jobs, Hildegard of Bingen, Marie
Sk lodowska Curie, Rabindranath Tagore, Albert Einstein, Michael Jackson and
Bjo¨rk. The 10 instances of BIRD, also chosen in order to present a highly diverse
list, were: blackbird, ostrich, rock bunting, Egyptian goose, gannet, kiwi, green
honeycreeper, emperor penguin, kingfisher and little grebe.
2.1.2 Results and discussion
Table 2.1.2 shows the mean typicality, familiarity and attitude ratings for all
instances of GENIUS and BIRD (ordered from high to low typicality).
Following the observations and speculations made by Armstrong et al. (1983);
Ashcraft (1978) and Malt and Smith (1982), and my own intuitions about the
accessibility factors that might influence people’s tendency to identify certain
people as ‘prototypical’ geniuses, I predict that apparent typicality judgements
for concepts denoted by gradable nouns (GENIUS, in this case) will be strongly
correlated with typicality-independent measures of accessibility (familiarity and
emotional attitude, in this case), while typicality ratings for BIRD will be in-
dependent from familiarity and attitude: they reflect ‘degree of bird-ness’ and
nothing else.
In order to test this prediction, I obtained Spearman correlation values com-
paring all responses on task 1 to all responses on task 2, and similarly for task 3
and task 2, for both GENIUS and BIRD. Furthermore (following a suggestion
from Galit Weidman Sassoon, p.c.) I calculated individual correlation values for
each participant and then checked whether the obtained correlations differed sig-
nificantly between the BIRD and GENIUS tasks by means of a paired-samples
t-test.
The results shown that the prediction is borne out. There are moderately
strong and highly significant (α=0.01) correlations between ‘typicality’ and fa-
miliarity and especially ‘typicality’ and attitude for GENIUS, while the correla-
tions for GENIUS are negligible and/or insignificant (table 2.1.2). Furthermore,
as table 5 shows, these differences in correlation - when obtained for each indi-
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Typicality Familiarity Attitude
Einstein 1.4 1.5 2.3
Da Vinci 1.5 1.7 2.1
Curie 2.8 3.2 2.5
Mendeleev 3.2 5.6 3.3
Jobs 3.7 1.8 4.4
Jackson 3.9 1.5 3.8
Tagore 4.5 6.6 3.7
Bingen 4.5 5.5 3.5
Bjo¨rk 4.7 2.9 3.3
Dickinson 4.8 4.5 3.0
Typicality Familiarity Attitude
Blackbird 1.4 1.8 2.9
Rock bunting 1.8 6.2 2.5
Kingfisher 1.9 2.8 1.8
Honeycreeper 2.1 6.6 2.0
Gannet 2.8 4.6 3.4
Grebe 3.1 6.3 4.0
Eg. goose 3.2 4.8 4.0
Ostrich 5.3 1.5 3.3
Kiwi 5.4 3.1 3.2
Em. penguin 5.7 2.3 1.7
Table 3: Mean typicality, familiarity & attitude ratings for all instances of BIRD
and GENIUS, ordered from high to low typicality.
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Typicality and familiarity Typicality and attitude
BIRD -0.1858 0.19724*
GENIUS 0.353* 0.58593*
Table 4: Spearman’s ρ correlation values between typicality (task 2), familiar-
ity (task 1) and attitude (task 3) ratings. Starred values are significant with
p  0.01; the non-starred correlation is significant with p  0.05. N=188.
Mean: Mean: standard
BIRD GENIUS paired t error p
Typicality-familiarity -0.2647 0.3900 7.5552 0.087  0.0001
Typicality-attitude 0.1447 0,5777 3.8397 0.113 0.0012
Table 5: The result of applying a paired-samples t-test to individual partici-
pants’ Spearman correlation values. N=19.
vidual participant - are also highly significant.
Of course these results only apply to the GENIUS-BIRD comparison, so
they are not enough to support any conclusions about the difference between
Morzycki-concepts and uncontroversially [+P] concepts in general. What I have
hoped to show is that various measures that have been experimentally connected
to prototypicality - such as fast categorisation speed, a high chance of being
mentioned by many people when asked to list instances of a concept, and a
high chance to appear at the top of such lists - may also be the result of other
accessibility-facilitating factors, so finding such patterns does not necessarily
reflect the prototype structure of a given concept.
2.2 Experiment 2
Experiments 2 and 3 were designed to test the hypothesis that the dimensions
most prominently associated with gradable noun concepts involve unbounded
gradable properties, while the dimensions most prominently associated with
non-gradable noun concepts are either non-gradable or bounded. The motiva-
tion behind this is twofold.
First, the degree to which an individual embodies a certain complex concept
is a function of the number of associated properties that individual has, but also
of the degree to which it embodies these properties. Whether or not a concept
has a prototype - whether it is possible to maximally embody that concept -
therefore depends on whether it is possible to maximally embody the properties
of which this concept is composed. For associated dimensions that involve non-
gradable, all-or-nothing properties (such as having eyes or being over 18 years
old), maximal embodiment simply means satisfying that property. For dimen-
sions involving specific degrees of gradable properties (such as having light blue
eyes or weighing 30 kilos), maximal embodiment means having the ideal value.
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But dimensions that involve an unbounded degree of some gradable property
(such as being tall, having high blood pressure, or loving opera) cannot be max-
imally embodied, since it is always possible to imagine some individual who is
just a tiny bit taller, has a slightly higher blood pressure, or an even greater
fondness of opera. From this it follows that any concept that is composed of such
unbounded dimensions cannot be maximally embodied. The following hypothe-
sis seems intuitive to me: the more central the role of unbounded dimensions in
determining concept membership, the more central the resulting lack of maximal
embodiment will be to our understanding of that concept, and the more likely
it is to affect the concept’s linguistic behaviour. Given our current assumptions,
this means that we expect membership of Morzycki-concepts to be determined
largely on the basis of unbounded dimensions, while membership of Sassoon-
concepts will be determined largely on the basis of non-gradable dimensions or
gradable dimensions with an ideal value.
However, this argument hinges on the implicit assumption that realistic de-
grees do not play any role in determining concept membership. This assumption
seems somewhat at odds with Rosch and Mervis (1975)’s claim that our mental
representation of a concept (and its prototype) is essentially based on family re-
semblance calculations performed on actual encountered instantiations of that
concept. This might lead us to expect that all concept dimensions are natu-
rally bounded by the limits of reality. For example, the heavier a person is
the more they embody the concept FAT, which seems to signify that FAT is
unbounded, but there are still limits to how heavy a human being can realisti-
cally be. Perhaps these natural limits serve to impose a bound on the concept’s
dimensions, such that it is possible after all to maximally embody a concept
like FAT. In other words, while a person who weighs 800 kilos is certainly fatter
than a person who weighs only 250 kilos, the latter might be a more prototyp-
ical embodiment of the concept FAT because it has more in common with the
actual instances of FAT on the basis of which a prototype for the concept might
be calculated. If this is the case, our reasoning behind the claim that certain
concepts lack a prototype, and consequently our attempt to link this property
to linguistic gradability, collapses. Before we can conclude that membership of
gradable noun concepts is determined on the basis of unbounded dimensions, we
therefore need to show that unbounded dimensions play a role in our conceptual
cognition in the first place, regardless of considerations of realism.7
In this section, I describe two experiments (the second one a follow-up on
the results of the first) designed to test the hypothesis that Morzycki-nouns are
mainly associated with unbounded dimensions, while Sassoon-nouns are mainly
7This question is reminiscent of the one explored in Barsalou (1985). Barsalou notes that
the prototype for goal-oriented concepts like DIET FOOD seems to involve non-realistic values:
the best example of a DIET FOOD is a product that contains zero calories, despite the fact that
zero-calorie food does not exist in real life. Thus, a concept’s prototype can have properties
that none of its instances have. Barsalou’s ideal-based approach to prototypes isn’t fully
applicable here because I am discussing [-P] concepts, but at least it shows that conceptual
structure is not fully determined by the properties of actually encountered instances.
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In this part, you will be shown 5 words for various categories. Your task is to list,
for each category, what you think are characteristic properties for a member of this
category. Here is an example for the category DOG:
Characteristics of a dog:
- it barks.
- it has a long tail.
- it wags its tail.
- it reaches approximately to my knees.
- it makes a very good pet.
- it can do tricks.
- it hates cats.
This task is NOT about free association: perhaps dogs remind you of your eccentric
Great Aunt Margot or of that one time the neighbours’ dog ate your homework, but
don’t write ‘Great Aunt Margot’ or ‘homework’. It’s about characteristic properties a
typical dog possesses according to you. It does not matter whether you can think of
exceptions - not all dogs hate cats, but it’s still a property that I strongly associate
with a typical dog and that’s why I included it in the list above.
Guidelines: 3 to 8 characteristics for each category, or what you can think of in ap-
proximately 30 seconds. Just write down what naturally occurs to you, don’t force
anything - it doesn’t matter whether you write down a lot or a little.
Table 6: Instructions for Experiment 2.
associated with bounded ones. Experiment 2 consisted of a dimension-naming
task, as in Rosch & Mervis (1975). Rosch and Mervis (1975) observe that
the dimensions that are most often listed by people are also the most accurate
predictors of prototypicality; the results of Experiment 2 should give us a fairly
good impression of the dimensions that are most prominently associated with
a concept, and hence of the properties that play the largest role in determining
concept membership. Subsequently, Experiment 3 was designed to test whether
a new set of participants preferred bounded, unbounded or non-graded ‘all-or-
nothing’ interpretations of the dimensions elicited in Experiment 2.
2.2.1 Method
Participants
Experiment 2 was part of the same Google Forms questionnaire that also in-
cluded Experiment 1, and served to break up the various subtasks of Experiment
1. It had the same 19 participants as Experiment 1.
Procedure
Participants were presented with five nominal concept names at a time (once in
between Task 1 and Task 2, once in between Task 2 and Task 3 of the question-
naire), 10 concept names in total. They were asked to take approximately 30
seconds per category name and make a list of properties they associated with
members of this category. Each part was preceded by identical instructions,
which were closely modeled on the ones used by Rosch & Mervis (1975; their
Experiment 1); a translated and slightly abridged version can be found in Table
6.
Stimuli
Five Morzycki-nouns and five Sassoon-nouns were used in Experiment 2, with
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the classification based on my own intuitions about their compatibility with
evaluative and size modification. The nouns were included in randomised order,
but not individually randomised for each participant.
(1) Sassoon: BIRD, CAR SALESMAN, VEGETABLE, ITEM OF FURNI-
TURE, STUDENT (all single words in Dutch)
(2) Morzycki: NERD, HIPSTER, FRATBOY, ARSEHOLE, NEUROTIC
2.2.2 Results
The results of Experiment 2 were tallied, and the five most commonly mentioned
dimensions were identified for each concept. The threshold of 5 dimensions was
chosen because most less-commonly mentioned dimensions were often mentioned
just once or twice and/or seemed a result of free association (e.g. ‘comedy’ for
NERD, ‘San Francisco’ for HIPSTER or ‘free as a bird’ for BIRD). On average,
participants listed the following number of dimensions for each concept: ITEM
OF FURNITURE 3.2, CAR SALESMAN 3.4, STUDENT 3.5, VEGETABLE
3.8, BIRD 4.9; NEUROTIC 2.6, ARSEHOLE 3.1, HIPSTER 3.5, NERD 4.4,
FRAT BOY 4.9.
There were several ties, which I resolved by collapsing some very similar
properties. For example, I collapsed several HIPSTER properties like ‘obsessed
with ‘pure’ and ‘authentic’ food’, ‘coffee geek’ and ‘loves rare beers’ into one um-
brella dimension ‘preoccupied with special, unique and ‘pure’ foods/beer/coffee’,
and collapsed ‘perfectionist’, ‘control freak’ and ‘obsessed with tiny details’ into
‘very detail-oriented’ in the case of NEUROTIC.
The five most commonly named dimensions for each concept can be found
in table 7.
2.3 Experiment 3
For the motivation behind Experiment 3, see section 2.2.
2.3.1 Method
Participants
Experiment 3 was sent out as a Google Forms questionnaire to 23 people (also
Dutch, recruited from my personal Facebook friends, and participating for a
chance to win a gift certificate), approximately a week after Experiment 1/2.
The two groups of participants overlapped to some extent: between 9 and 15
participants in Experiment 3 had previously filled out the questionnaire that
included Experiments 1 and 210.
10Participants could provide their e-mail addresses in order to compete for the gift cer-
tificates; there was an overlap of 9 addresses between the first and second questionnaires, in
addition to 6 participants (in total) who did not provide an address.
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BIRD CAR SALESMAN VEGETABLE
Has feathers Smartly dressed Healthy
Has wings Smooth talker Green
Flies Untrustworthy Grows on the ground
Lays eggs Friendly, jovial behaviour Cooked before eating
Has a beak Knowledgeable about cars Eaten for dinner8
FURNITURE STUDENT
Practical use Attends college/university
Used inside the house Young (early twenties)
Made of wood Active social life
Has legs Intelligent
For sitting or putting things on Lives in a student room/dorm
NERD FRATBOY HIPSTER
Good with computers Drinks lots of beer Alternative/eccentric style
Wears glasses Posh accent9 Has a beard
Intelligent Wears a suit jacket & tie Wears glasses
Socially awkward Loud Obsessed with special, unique
Peculiar interests/obsessions Arrogant and ‘pure’ foods/beer/coffee
Loves obscure bands
ARSEHOLE NEUROTIC
Mean, unsympathetic personality Nervous, agitated behaviour
Mean, unsympathetic behaviour Very detail-oriented
Is a man Worries a lot
Selfish Has tics and compulsions
Doesn’t care about others Insecure
Table 7: Results of Experiment 2: the five most commonly mentioned dimen-
sions for each concept.
Procedure
Participants were presented with a list of 50 items (divided into 5 blocks, each
on a new page), each based on one of the concept dimensions listed in Table
7. Each of these dimensions was presented in three different ways, and partici-
pants were asked to choose the formulation they felt captured the membership
criterion most accurately. The questionnaire as a whole was prefaced by a short
introduction identical to the introduction to Experiment 1/2, explaining that
I was interested in questions of categorisation such as “Is an avocado a fruit?”
and “Is a skateboard a vehicle?”, and the various bases on which people make
such decisions. This introduction was followed by an instruction, a translation
of which can be found in Table 8. A short summary of the instructions (without
the examples) was repeated at the top of each of the 5 pages of the task.
Stimuli
Each of the 50 dimensions obtained in Experiment 2 was presented in three
different ways, and participants were asked to choose the formulation they felt
captured the membership criterion most accurately. Thus, for example, one
dimension associated with NERD would be the wearing of glasses, which was
then formulated in three different ways (the labels ‘all-or-nothing’, ‘bounded’
and ‘unbounded’ have been added here for clarity and were not part of the
original items):
(3) A real, typical nerd:
a. All-or-nothing: wears glasses.
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You will be shown 50 membership criteria for various concepts, for example “A typical
dog weighs around 25-30 kilograms” or “A typical vehicle has wheels”. Each of these
criteria is formulated in several different ways. For instance:
A typical vehicle:
(a) has wheels
(b) has 4 wheels
(c) has an even number of wheels
(d) has wheels; the more the better
Your task is to choose the formulation that, according to you, best represents how
you would apply this particular criterion when you are judging whether something or
someone is a member of a given category or not. In the above case, you could choose (a)
if you think that having wheels as such is important, not so much the particular number
of wheels; (b) if you think a vehicle with 4 wheels (like a car) is clearly a ‘better’, more
typical vehicle than a vehicle with some other number of wheels (like a bicycle or a
train), and (c) if you feel that vehicles with an even number of wheels (bicycle, car,
train) are more typical than vehicles with an odd number of wheels (unicycle, tricycle,
rickshaw). Finally, you could choose option (d) if you think that vehicles with lots of
wheels are inherently more typical than vehicles with few wheels. NB: ‘better’ here
means “a better example of the category VEHICLE” - it has nothing to do with a
positive value judgement.
If your favourite option isn’t listed, choose the one that most resembles it.
The given options are different for each question, but always speak for themselves. It
is important to follow your intuition when choosing an answer. There are no right
or wrong answers and it doesn’t matter one bit whether your answers are rational or
consistent.
Table 8: Instructions for Experiment 3.
b. Bounded: wears strong glasses, but not ridiculously strong ones.
c. Unbounded: wears glasses; the stronger the better.
For a complete list of items, see Appendix B.
According to the ‘unbounded’ option, a higher score on a particular dimen-
sion also means a higher concept membership score, regardless of whether this is
realistic. According to the ‘bounded’ option, typical instantiations of a certain
concept possess a certain quantifiable property, but only up to some extent.
According to the ‘all-or-nothing’ option; the degree to which an instantiation
possesses a certain property is not important, and the only relevant distinction
is between individuals that have the property and individuals that lack it.
In formulating the bounded options, I deliberately used modifiers like ‘exces-
sively’, ‘ridiculously’ and ‘unrealistically’ in order to present these boundaries
as natural and realistic; I surmised that if people picked the unbounded option
regardless of its implied excessiveness or ridiculousness, this would indicate that
considerations of realism did not play a role in determining concept membership
along the dimension in question.
All items followed the pattern exemplified above: a description of the form
A real, typical X: followed by the 3 options, always in the same order (all-or-
nothing, bounded, unbounded). The 50 items of the questionnaire (10 concepts
x 5 dimensions) were presented in 5 blocks, each containing one dimension for
each concept, in random order.
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Figure 1: Total proportion of picks for each of the three dimension types. The
Sassoon nouns are on the left, the Morzycki nouns on the right.
2.3.2 Results and discussion
The predictions of the present approach were borne out. For the Sassoon nouns,
participants overwhelmingly favoured the bounded and all-or-nothing options;
but for the Morzycki nouns, they picked the ‘unbounded’ options significantly
more often. The graph in figure 1 shows the total proportion of all-or-nothing,
bounded and unbounded picks for each of the 10 concepts. To make sure the
differences were not purely due to one or two different dimensions, I assigned a
final label to each of the 50 dimensions based on the type that was picked most
often (thus, a dimension that has more ‘all-or-nothing’ responses than either
of the other two types was labelled ‘all-or-nothing’, and so on). The results
become even more pronounced, as shown in figure 2: the only Sassoon noun
with a dimension that was judged unbounded by a majority of participants was
car salesman (the dimension in question was ‘is a smooth talker’), while all
Morzycki nouns had at least one unbounded dimension (and three of them at
least 3 out of 5). Finally, I made sure that the differences between Sassoon and
Morzycki nouns held within individual participants by comparing the number
of all-or-nothing, bounded and unbounded responses for each participant across
the two noun categories by means of a paired-samples t-test. The results can be
seen in table 9. As the table shows, all three dimension types showed a significant
difference: people picked the all-or-nothing and bounded options significantly
more often for the non-gradable nouns, and the unbounded options significantly
more often for the gradable nouns.
3 Discussion and conclusions
The results of these small-scale experiments support the hypothesis that the
class of ‘Morzycki-nouns’ - nouns that pattern with relative adjectives in allow-
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Figure 2: The number of all-or-nothing, bounded and unbounded dimensions for
each concept; the assigned type is the one picked most often by the participants.
The Sassoon nouns are on the left, the Morzycki ones on the right.
mean no. mean no.
of picks: of picks: standard
Morzycki Sassoon paired t error p
All-or-nothing 7.48 11.22 3.5850 1.043 0.0016
Bounded 5.22 10.91 6.9805 0.816  0.0001
Unbounded 12.3 2.87 9.221717 1.023  0.0001
Table 9: Comparison between the number of all-or-nothing, bounded and un-
bounded picks for the five Morzycki nouns and the five Sassoon nouns, for each
individual participant, by means of a paired-samples t-test. N=23.
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ing size and evaluative modification, but not endpoint modification, and can
be shown to be linguistically gradable using several monotonicity-based tests
- correspond to [+G-P] concepts in Kamp & Partee’s typology, just like rela-
tive adjectives. They also show that considerations of realism do not seem to
play a role in determining concept membership for [-P] concepts (supporting an
understanding of prototypicality in terms of maximal embodiment and nothing
else). Moreover, the results of Experiment 1 suggest that the fact that some
[-P] concepts, like GENIUS, intuitively seem to have a prototype may actually
reflect independent aspects of instance accessibility.
Let us briefly return to the questions I started out this paper with. In the intro-
duction I tentatively concluded, following many others, that an accurate theory
of conceptual cognition probably needs elements from both Prototype Theory
and the classical, definition-based theory of concepts. Previous researchers have
mainly based this conclusion on philosophical and psychological arguments; I
have added a linguistic one. By showing that the various concept classes identi-
fied by Kamp & Partee (1995) show distinct linguistic behaviour (and conversely,
that various natural language expressions that show distinct linguistic behaviour
also fall into different concept classes), I have provided additional support for
the psychological reality of such a typology - most importantly, the distinction
between concepts that have prototypes and concepts that lack them (or whose
prototypes do not determine their extension).
A few problems and questions remain. First, it should be noted (as an anony-
mous reviewer did) that the Kamp & Partee-inspired argument based on which
I claimed that concepts like NERD lack prototypes - it is always possible to
imagine someone who embodies the concept more - also holds for concepts
like GRANDMOTHER, yet GRANDMOTHER is commonly assumed (also by
Kamp & Partee) to have a prototype and does not correspond to a Morzycki-
noun. I do not have an immediate answer to this, but I speculate that an
answer may be sought in another aspect of the Kamp/Partee typology I did not
really go into: the [PE] distinction between [+P] concepts whose extension
is determined by typicality and [+P] concepts whose extension is determined
by definitional criteria. Note that it is usually possible to ‘coerce’ [G+P-PE]
concepts like GRANDMOTHER into [+PE] concepts:
(4) I spent all day on the couch. I feel like such a granny.
(5) a. Mary was acting like a big girl.
b. John was acting like a big girl.
The speaker of (4) does not mean that she feels like a woman who has grandchil-
dren; instead, she’s claiming something about her resemblance to the GRAND-
MOTHER prototype. The contrast in (5) is particularly striking: if we use big
girl to describe someone who fits the definitional criteria of GIRL, the adjec-
tive big receives its standard intersective size interpretation: to act like a big
girl, for a girl, is to act like a girl who is big. In contrast, if we use the same
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predicate to describe someone outside of the extension of GIRL, girl effectively
starts behaving like a Morzycki noun, meaning something like ‘girlish person’.
When used this way, the size adjective receives a degree reading: to act like
a big girl, for a boy, is to act very girlishly (. Do these ‘coerced’ versions of
GRANDMOTHER and GIRL have prototypes, and if they do, what would that
mean for the present analysis of Morzycki nouns as [-P] concepts? Perhaps fu-
ture research may show the [-P] hypothesis is too strong in its current form.
Another interesting observation involving [+P-PE] concepts may connect the
present approach to the work of Galit Weidman Sassoon on nominal gradabil-
ity. Intuitively, [-PE] concepts are concepts that somehow ‘exist independently’
from the way they are experienced by humans, while [+PE] concepts are defined
by human perception. There is no law of nature deciding which objects count
as furniture and which do not - furniture is a category made up by humans in
order to describe something they created. On the other hand, platonic objects
such as circles and natural kinds such as grandmothers ‘exist’ and obey certain
natural laws regardless of human perception or activity. In other words, there
seems to be an intuitive connection between what Sassoon calls ‘social nouns’ -
human roles and artifacts - and [+PE] concepts on the one hand, and natural
kind nouns and [-G-PE] concepts on the other. Recently, Sassoon and Fadlon
(2015) have shown that social nouns are significantly more compatible with var-
ious degree constructions than natural kind nouns; following the Kamp/Partee
typology, the latter correspond to sharp concepts (or non-gradable concepts, in
my adaptation), while the former (necessarily) correspond to vague (or gradable)
ones. Sassoon and Fadlon (2015) account for their findings in a different way,
claiming that the differences in linguistic gradability drives from the different
ways the values on the concept’s dimensions are integrated into a single degree
scale, but perhaps there is a way to unify or at least connect the two approaches.
Finally, let me point out a possible connection between emotional attitude
and linguistic gradability. Many of the Morzycki-nouns are quite emotion-
ally charged (either positive or negative), while the Sassoon-nouns generally
are more neutral. Furthermore, Dutch has a reliable way to come up with new
Morzycki-nouns by compounding any noun with an expletive from its impressive
collection (such as kut ‘cunt’, klote ‘bollocks’ or tering ‘tubercolosis’) - e.g. kutk-
lus ‘detestable job’, klotehond ‘awful dog’, teringwereld ‘horrible world’. These
linguistically gradable compounds are evidently highly emotionally charged as
well. I do not have an immediate explanation for this, but I do not think it
is a coincidence - note also that the Sassoon noun that behaved most like the
Morzycki nouns in Experiment 3 was car salesman, which people also tend to
have an emotionally charged reaction to (among the properties most often at-
tributed to car salesmen in Experiment 2 was ‘untrustworthy’, and properties in
the vein of ‘slick’, ‘smarmy’ and ‘pushy’ also got several mentions). Hopefully,
further research will shed more light on the relation of emotional attitude to the
linguistic gradability of nouns.
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All experimental materials below are translated from the original Dutch.
A Experiment 1
The items on the two lists below were shown 3 times at different points in the
questionnaire; each time, all 10 instantiations of the concept were shown in the
same order and on a single page. In each of the 3 parts, subjects rated each
item on a 7-point scale (by ticking a box) according to a different criterion: first,
familiarity; second, typicality; and third, emotional attitude. Items consisted of
a name and a picture with a mouse-over description.
Birds
Name Picture Mouse-over text
Blackbird
This 25-cm-tall songbird oc-
curs mainly in Europe. It’s
an omnivore with an extensive
song repertoire.
Ostrich
The ostrich lives in Africa and
is the biggest bird on earth. It
can’t fly but it can run very
fast. Females lay their eggs in
a common nest and take turns
brooding.
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Birds - continued from previous page
Rock bunting
This 16-cm-tall songbird oc-
curs in Asia, Northern Africa
and Southern Europe. It
nests on or close to the ground
and feeds on insects and seeds.
Egyptian goose
This waterfowl isn’t actually
a goose but a duck. Orig-
inally from Africa; the ones
we find in the Netherlands are
feralised ornamental birds.
Gannet
This large, aerodynamic
seabird hunts for fish in
the North Sea and Atlantic
Ocean. Its legs and wings
are weak, so it can only fly
in strong winds. Is a stellar
diver.
Kiwi
This New-Zealand bird is
roughly the size of a chicken,
but lays eggs six times the size
of a chicken’s egg. It can’t fly
and is mainly nocturnal.
Green
honeycreeper
A small tropical songbird that
occurs in Central and South
America. Feeds predomi-
nantly on nectar.
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Birds - continued from previous page
Emperor penguin
The biggest penguin; mea-
sures up to 120 cm and weighs
up to 45 kilos. Subsists
mainly on fish. It can’t fly,
but it can dive up to 500 me-
ters deep and stay underwater
for up to 18 minutes.
Kingfisher
This 16-cm-tall bird occurs in
Europe, Asia and Northern
Africa. It dives for fish and
nests in steep riverbanks.
Little grebe
This small, shy water bird is
related to the great crested
grabe. It occurs in large parts
of Europe, Asia and Africa
and feeds mainly on water in-
sects and larvae.
Geniuses
Name Picture Mouse-over text
Leonardo da
Vinci
(1452-1519): Italian artist, scientist,
architect and inventor. Considered
one of the best painters ever, with
the Mona Lisa as his most famous
work. His designs include things as
wide-ranging as defence works, mu-
sical instruments to unbuildable but
ingenious flying machines. Was also
a gifted astronomer and physiologist.
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Geniuses - continued from previous page
Emily Dick-
inson
(1830-1886): American poet who
lived her life in near-total seclusion.
Published only a few poems during
her lifetime (which her publisher ad-
justed to conform to the age’s style
and taste; her enormous body of work
was only discovered after her death.
Now considered one of the great-
est American poets, whose unconven-
tional style placed her far ahead of her
time.
Dmitri
Mendeleev
(1834-1907): Russian chemist and in-
ventor of the Periodic Table of Ele-
ments, a spatial ordering of all chem-
ical elements based on their proper-
ties, which came to him in a dream.
It correctly predicted the existence of
various elements that hadn’t yet been
discovered.
Steve Jobs
(1955-2011): Entrepreneur and pi-
oneer of the 70s computer revolu-
tion. Saved the struggling Apple
company with innovative technology
and groundbreaking, iconic design.
Was also CEO of Pixar, which under
his leadership produced several of the
most critically acknowledged anima-
tion films ever.
Hildegard
von Bingen
(1098-1179): Benedictine abbess,
writer, poet, composer, mystical the-
ologian, scientist and philosopher. Is
considered one of the founders of
natural history as a scientific field.
For her religious poetry, she invented
her own script and hundreds of new
words. Her music is still regularly
performed.
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Geniuses - continued from previous page
Marie Sk lo-
dowska
Curie
(1967-1934)11: Polish-French physi-
cist and chemist, pioneer in the
field of radioactivity (which eventu-
ally caused her death). She was the
first female professor at the univer-
sity of Paris, the first woman to win
a Nobel prize, the first person to win
a second Nobel prize, and the only re-
cipient of two Nobel prizes in different
categories.
Rabindranath
Tagore
(1861-1942): Bengali poet, com-
poser, writer, painter, independence
and peace activist and education re-
former. Published his first volume of
poetry when he was 16, and his first
opera when he was 20. Was the first
non-western winner of the Nobel prize
for literature (in 1913) and used the
prize money to found his own univer-
sity. Wrote the national anthems of
both India and Bangladesh.
Albert
Einstein
(1879-1955): German physicist and
founder of the theory of relativity. At
27, in a single year, he published 4
revolutionary physics papers on dif-
ferent topics, written in his spare time
next to his day job as an office clerk.
Published over 300 scientific articles
during his lifetime and won a Nobel
prize in 1921.
Michael
Jackson
(1958-2009): Eccentric singer, song-
writer, dancer and producer known as
the ‘King of Pop’. Began his singing
career as a five-year-old, in the family
group The Jackson Five. His album
‘Thriller’ is the best-sold album of all
time; the eponymous music video is
considered revolutionary and is the
only music video ever to be included
in the American national film reg-
istry.
11Note the typo in these dates (1967 instead of 1867); I do not expect this to have influenced
the results in any way.
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Geniuses - continued from previous page
Bjo¨rk
(1965-): This Icelandic singer and
multi-instrumentalist released her de-
but album when she was 11. Is
known for her groundbreaking, avant-
gardistic music and unique mu-
sic videos, on which she collabo-
rates with international film direc-
tors, artists and fashion designers. In
2011, she released an album consist-
ing fully of interactive apps, which
has since been included in the perma-
nent collection of the MoMA in New
York. Has also received multiple act-
ing awards.
B Experiment 3
The items on the list below were shown in blocks of 10 items per page; within
each page, items were randomised differently for each participant. Each item
started with the statement “A real, typical X...” followed by 3 possible continua-
tions; first, an All-or-nothing one (A); second, a Bounded one (B); and third, an
Unbounded one (U). Participants had to choose exactly 1 of the continuations
by ticking a box.
The Dutch construction translated here somewhat inaccurately with ‘but
not’ is maar ook weer niet (‘but also again not’), which is used to qualify a
previous utterance by explicitly negating a stronger alternative, e.g. Ze was
boos, maar ook weer niet woedend ‘she was angry, but not exactly furious’. It
is somewhat weaker than plain ‘but not’; a speaker who utters maar ook weer
niet X seems to be hedging her commitment to the belief that X is false. As a
result, the B continuations involve a slight asymmetry that is mostly lost in the
translations below: the boundedness of the property is of secondary importance
to possessing it in the first place.
Items: NERD Page
A real, typical nerd: 1
A has a peculiar hobby/interest that he/she puts a lot of time into and
knows a lot about.
B has a peculiar hobby/interest that he/she puts a lot of time into and
knows a lot about, but not an unrealistic lot.
U has a peculiar hobby/interest that he/she puts a lot of time into and
knows a lot about - the more the better.
A real, typical nerd: 2
A has great computer skills.
B has great computer skills, but not unrealistically great.
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NERD - continued from previous page
U has great computer skills - the greater the skills, the better.
A real, typical nerd: 3
A is socially awkward.
B is socially awkward, but not extremely socially awkward.
U is socially awkward - the more socially awkward, the better.
A real, typical nerd: 4
A wears glasses.
B wears strong glasses, but not ridiculously strong.
U wears strong glasses - the stronger, the better.
A real, typical nerd: 5
A is intelligent.
B is intelligent, but not absurdly intelligent.
U is intelligent - the more intelligent, the better.
Items: FRAT BOY Page
A real, typical frat boy: 1
A behaves in an arrogant manner.
B behaves in an arrogant manner, but not absurdly arrogant.
U behaves in an arrogant manner - the more arrogant, the better.
A real, typical frat boy: 2
A wears a suit jacket and tie.
B wears a suit jacket and tie, but not 24/7.
U wears a suit jacket and tie - the more often the better, he preferably
sleeps in them too.
A real, typical frat boy: 3
A has a posh accent.
B has a posh accent, but not extremely posh.
U has a posh accent - the posher, the frattier.
A real, typical frat boy: 4
A drinks a lot of beer.
B drinks a lot of beer, but not an unrealistic lot.
U drinks a lot of beer - the more, and the more frequently, the frattier.
A real, typical frat boy: 5
A is loud and obnoxious.
B is loud and obnoxious, but not ridiculously loud and obnoxious.
U is loud and obnoxious - the louder and more obnoxious, the better.
Items: HIPSTER Page
A real, typical hipster: 1
A wears glasses.
B wears glasses, but not extremely prominent ones.
U wears glasses - the more prominent, the more hipsterish.
A real, typical hipster: 2
A has an alternative, eccentric style.
B has an alternative, eccentric style, but not extremely alternative or
eccentric.
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HIPSTER - continued from previous page
U has an alternative, eccentric style - the more alternative/eccentric, the
better.
A real, typical hipster: 3
A has a long and/or wild beard.
B has a long and/or wild beard, but not extremely long or wild.
U has a long and/or wild bird - the longer/wilder, the more hipsterish.
A real, typical hipster: 4
A loves obscure music.
B loves obscure music, but not extremely obscure.
U loves obscure music - the more obscure and unknown, the better.
A real, typical hipster: 5
A is preoccupied with special, unique and ’pure’ food/coffee/beers.
B is preoccupied with special, unique and ’pure’ food/coffee/beers, but
not extremely obsessed by them.
U is preoccupied with special, unique and ’pure’ food/coffee/beers - the
bigger his/her obsession, the better.
Items: ARSEHOLE Page
A real, typical arsehole: 1
A cares little about other people’s needs.
B cares little about other people’s needs, but is not completely uncaring.
U cares little about other people’s needs - the less, the better.
A real, typical arsehole: 2
A has an unsympathetic personality.
B has an unsympathetic personality, but also not pathologically unsym-
pathetic.
U has an unsympathetic personality - the more unsympathetic, the bet-
ter.
A real, typical arsehole: 3
A is a man.
B is a man, but not an absurdly masculine testosterone bomb.
U is a man - the more masculine, the better.
A real, typical arsehole: 4
A behaves in a rude, mean manner.
B behaves in a rude, mean manner, but not excessively rude or mean.
U behaves in a rude, mean manner - the worse and the more often, the
better.
A real, typical arsehole: 5
A is selfish.
B is selfish, but doesn’t always think of nobody but himself.
U is selfish - the more selfish, the better.
Items: NEUROTIC Page
A real, typical neurotic: 1
A worries about everything.
B worries about everything, but not inordinately deeply or frequently.
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U worries about everything - the deeper and more frequent the worries,
the more neurotic.
A real, typical neurotic: 2
A has tics and compulsive tendencies.
B has tics and compulsive tendencies, but moderately.
U has tics and compulsive tendencies - the more, the more neurotic.
A real, typical neurotic: 3
A behaves in a nervous and agitated manner.
B behaves in a nervous and agitated manner, but not excessively nervous
and agitated.
U behaves in a nervous and agitated manner - the more nervous and
agitated, the more neurotic.
A real, typical neurotic: 4
A is insecure.
B is insecure, but not overly insecure.
U is insecure - the more insecure, the more neurotic.
A real, typical neurotic: 5
A is focused on tiny details.
B is focused on tiny details, but not absurdly so.
U is focused on tiny details - the more focused, and the more trivial the
details, the better.
Items: BIRD Page
A real, typical bird: 1
A lays eggs.
B lays eggs, but not extremely many.
U lays eggs - the more the better.
A real, typical bird: 2
A flies.
B flies, but not all day long.
U flies - the longer and the more often, the better.
A real, typical bird: 3
A has feathers.
B has feathers, but also spots without feathers.
U has feathers all over its body, the more the better.
A real, typical bird: 4
A has wings.
B has wings, but not overly prominent ones.
U has wings - the more prominent the better.
A real, typical bird: 5
A has a beak.
B has a beak, but not an extremely big or striking one.
U has a beak - the more big/striking, the better.
Items: CAR SALESMAN Page
A real, typical car salesman: 1
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CAR SALESMAN - continued from previous page
A knows a lot about cars.
B knows a lot about cars, but not an extreme lot.
U knows a lot about cars - the more, the better.
A real, typical car salesman: 2
A dresses smartly.
B dresses smartly, but not too smart.
U dresses smartly - the smarter, the better.
A real, typical car salesman: 3
A is a smooth talker.
B is a smooth talker, but not absurdly smooth.
U is a smooth talker - the smoother, the better.
A real, typical car salesman: 4
A is untrustworthy.
B is untrustworthy, but not extremely untrustworthy.
U is untrustworthy - the more untrustworthy, the better.
A real, typical car salesman: 5
A behaves in a friendly and jovial manner.
B behaves in a friendly and jovial manner, but not overly friendly and
jovial.
U behaves in a friendly and jovial manner - the more friendly and jovial,
the better.
Items: FURNITURE Page
A real, typical item of furniture: 1
A has a surface for sitting or putting something on.
B has a surface for sitting or putting something on, which is neither too
big nor too small.
U has a surface for sitting or putting something on - the bigger the
surface the better.
A real, typical item of furniture: 2
A is made of wood.
B is made of wood, but also incorporates other materials.
U is made of wood - the more wooden bits it has, the better.
A real, typical item of furniture: 3
A is used inside the house.
B is used inside the house, but sometimes outside too.
U is used only inside the house, never outside.
A real, typical item of furniture: 4
A serves a practical purpose.
B serves a practical purpose, but also has an aesthetic/artistic compo-
nent.
U serves a practical purpose - the more practical, the better.
A real, typical item of furniture: 5
A has legs.
B has 4 legs.
U has legs - the more legs, and/or the higher their prominence, the
better.
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Items: VEGETABLE Page
A real, typical vegetable: 1
A is eaten for dinner.
B is eaten dinner, but occasionally as part of other meals too.
U is eaten for dinner and never as part of another meal.
A real, typical vegetable: 2
A is healthy.
B is healthy, but not some extremely healthy superfood.
U is healthy - the healthier, the better.
A real, typical vegetable: 3
A is green.
B is mainly green, but has some other colours too.
U is green - the greener the better.
A real, typical vegetable: 4
A needs to be cooked before you can eat it.
B needs to be cooked before you can eat it, but not too long.
U needs to be cooked before you can eat it - the longer the better.
A real, typical vegetable: 5
A grows on the ground (and not on a tree).
B grows on the ground, but not directly on the ground.
U grows on the ground - the closer to the ground, the better.
Items: STUDENT Page
A real, typical student: 1
A lives in a student room/dorm.
B lives in a student room/dorm, but often returns to his/her parents.
U lives in a student room/dorm and spends as little as possible time at
his/her parents’.
A real, typical student: 2
A studies at college or university.
B studies at college or university, but isn’t focused on his/her studies
24/7.
U studies at college or university - the more time spent on studying, the
better.
A real, typical student: 3
A is intelligent.
B is intelligent, but not absurdly intelligent.
U is intelligent - the more intelligent, the better.
A real, typical student: 4
A is young.
B is young, but not extremely young.
U is young - the younger the better.
A real, typical student: 5
A has an active social life.
B has an active social life, but not outrageously active.
U has an active social life - the more active, the better.
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